Neo-Confucianism and Literary Criticism in Ming China: The Case of T'ang Shun-chih (1507–1560)

Ching-I Tu

In an interesting exchange of views on literary criticism and philospohy, René Wellek criticized F.R. Leavis for his failure in the book *Revaluation* to state his basic assumptions "more explicitly" and defend them systematically.[1] He said that as a critic he would have qualms in pronouncing Leavis' assumptions "without developing a specific defense or theory in their defense." Every critic, according to Wellek, has an ideal of literature, whether stated or not, and a "norm" with which he apprises every writer or literary composition. It is clear from these remarks that Wellek suggested a close relationship between literary criticism and philosophy.

Without denying such a relationship, Leavis argued that literary criticism and philosophy are nevertheless quite distinct and different disciplines. The task of the literary critic, in his opinion, is to "attain a peculiar completeness of response and to observe a peculiarly strict relevance in developing his response into commentary."[2] The critic is neither concerned with abstracting from what is in front of him nor with generalizing of it or from it. But, at the same time, Leavis admitted to the existence of various valuable critical writings displaying different kinds of associations between the literary critic and the philosopher.

The belief in a close relationship between literary criticism and philosophy" finds further support in a common theory that literature can be regarded as "a document in the history of ideas and philosophy" since literary history parallels and reflects intellectual history.[3] There are often clear statements or inferences showing the affinity of a writer to a particular philosophy or indicating that he has had some familiarity with the well-known schools of philosophy either of or before his time.

The history of literature of both the West and the East abounds in examples of close collaboration between philosophy and literature or literary

criticism. Among the Romantic poets, Coleridge was himself a technical philosopher of "great ambition and some standing," and Wordsworth was much in debt to the Kantian philosophy. German philosophers like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel even lived with their contemporary poets. At the time of the symbolist movement, the Russian school of metaphysical critics interpreted literature entirely in terms of their own philosophical views.[4]

In China we find a similar phenomenon. The long tradition of didacticism in Chinese literature beginning with Confucius is a good testimony to the close relationship between literature and philosophy. The neo-classical movement in prose during the T'ang-Sung period, with its slogan that "the function of literature is to convey the principle," was in essence a union of literature and philosophy.

The history of Chinese philosophy after the Sung period developed with the Rationalistic School of Neo-Confucianism as its core. In the early days of the Ming dynasty the Cheng-Chu School of Principle continued to be the strongest intellectual current of the time, and its interpretations of the Confucian classics were, as in the Yüan dynasty, officially held as the orthodox doctrines in the civil service examination system. Chu Hsi's theory of the identification of Nature and Principle and his doctrine of the investigation of things as the method of extention of knowledge remained the cardinal teachings for students in both objective observation and moral cultivation.

But towards the middle of the Ming dynasty, the intellectual vitality of the Cheng-Chu School became withered. The much praised spirit of rational inquiry and sincere search for basic principles and values, which characterized the Cheng-Chu School at the height of its development, had fallen into disrepute, or what was called trifling with "fragmentary and isolated details and broken pieces."[5] Likewise, the civil service examinations were no longer viewed as before as a vehicle for "serving the people and bringing peace to the world," but rather had become a motive for personal gain and success. Moreover, contrary to Chu Hsi's estimate, the honored Confucian classics were now being used to restrain creativity and freedom of thought. In short, the philosophy of the Cheng-Chu School had lost its original intellectual appeal and moral strength and turned into sheer scholasticism.[6] It was under these circumstances that Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) rose against the Cheng-Chu School and provided the needed "injection of new vigor and fresh life" into the Confucian tradition.

According to Wang Yang-ming the origin of the difficulty with the Cheng-Chu School of philosophy was its doctrine of investigation of things.

In maintaining that every physical object, even as small as a blade of grass, has its own principle and each, therefore, should be investigated, the doctrine distracted people from the basic principles of things and the essentials of life.[7] Furthermore, by advocating that the mind should go to things to examine the principles residing in them, the doctrine held things as exterior and separated the mind and principle. Consequently, the mind lost both its direction and its motivation. As one scholar states, the more the orthodoxy of Chu Hsi's philosophy was stressed, the more the serious student became distressed by the disparity between mind and principle.[8]

Perceiving the inseparability between mind and principle, Wang Yang-ming returned to the theory of mind and principle first introduced by Lu Hsiang-shan. In addition, he developed his well-known theories such as the extension of innate knowledge and the unity of knowledge and action. The originality of Wang's ideas together with his exemplary accomplishments as a statesman and military commander immediately attracted a large following. His philosophy known as dynamic idealism gradually replaced the Cheng-Chu school as the dominant thought for the next one hundred and fifty years. In fact, it is hard to find an equal in Chinese history to the powerful domination which Wang Yang-ming's school of philosophy exerted throughout China.[9]

The change from the Cheng-Chu School to the Wang Yang-ming School as the dominant philosophy after the middle of the Ming finds its parallel in the domain of critical thought of that period. More specifically, this change can be seen in the development of the critical thinking of one of the leading critics, T'ang Shun-chih. It has been noted that before the rise of the Wang Yang-ming School most of the literary critics including Sung Lien (1310-1381), Li Tung-yang (1447-1516), and the Former Seven Masters were intellectually strongly oriented towards the Cheng-Chu School.[10] Their concern with the formal and technical aspects of literature and their emphasis on *fa* (methods or rules of literary craftsmanship) show an unmistakable affinity with the theory of investigation of things held by the Cheng-Chu School. After the emergence of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy, the pattern in critical thinking echoed the theory of the mind and principle as well as the identification of substance and effort of self-cultivation.

Let us turn to a direct consideration of T'ang Shun-chih's life and critical ideas. Long recognized as a major essayist and literary theorist of the Ming dynasty, T'ang was born to a scholar-official family in Wu-chin of the present Kiangsu Province. Having passed the civil service examination for the *chin-*

shih degree in 1529 he was first appointed to the Hanlin Academy, and then transferred to the Ministry of War. In 1533 he was transferred back to the Hanlin Academy as a compiler. Finally he rose to the position of governor of Feng-yang in 1560, after several appointments in military campaigns against the pirates on the off-shore islands along Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces. In the very same year he died while on a journey to the south.

T'ang was a man of broad learning, versed in many subjects ranning from astronomy and geography to divination and mathematics. His literary caeer underwent several changes. Initially, he followed the trend of his time established by the Former Seven Masters that prose writing had been brought to its perfection in the Ch'in and Han, and poetry in the flourishing T'ang. Consequently, he tended to imitate writers of the Ch'in and Han. Later, under the influence of Wang Shen-chung (1509-1559), he discarded this practice and took for his models the master essayists of the T'ang and the Sung, particularly Ou-yang Hsiu and Tseng kung. He set as his goal to make his own mode of expression more natural and fluent. Along with Wang Shen-chung, Mao K'un (1512-1601), and Kuei Yu-kuang (1507-1571), T'ang was credited with the revival of the tradition of the prose style of the T'ang and Sung, and the rejuvenation of Ming literature.[11]

In addition, T'ang compiled an anthology known as the *Ching-ch'uan wen-pien.* It is of importance in two respects. First, it embodied T'ang's principles about the writing of prose. Secondly, through the selection of only the writings of Han Yu, Liu Tsung-yüan, Ou-yang Hsiu, Su Hsün, Su Shih, Su Ch'e, Tseng Kung, and Wang An-shih for the T'ang-Sung period, T'ang Shun-chih was originally responsible for the coining of the term *T'ang-Sung pa-ta-chia* (Eight Great Prose Masters of the T'ang and Sung).[12]

In his own writings, T'ang strove to achieve a natural and harmonious blending of ideas and language without leaving any traces of labor and effort in creation. In other words, his aim was to attain a literature whose method lies in having no visible methods or rules. The best of his writings are biographies, inscriptions, and epitaphes. For instance, his *"Hsü Shen Hsi-i kuang-yu chan-kung"* (A record of Shen Hsi-i's military achievements in Kuangsi) has been praised as a marvel in Chinese literature.[13] It also became the basis for the biography of Shen Hsi-i in the history of the Ming dynasty. It might be interesting to note that this essay by T'ang was written after his conversion to the Wang Yang-ming philosophy, and the hero, Shen Hsi-i, was none other than the deputy general of Wang Yang-ming.

In the realm of literary criticism and theory, T'ang Shun-chih is

particularly noted for successfully explaining the concept of *fa,* and thus providing the theoretical basis for the T'ang-Sung School in prose writing in the Ming period. As T'ang says:

> The prose writings before the Han period were never without method, yet never had methods; since their method lies in the absence of methods, the method is esoteric and cannot be espied. The prose writings of the T'ang and later periods cannot do without method but can observe methods without missing a centimeter or millimeter; since their method lies in having methods, the method is strict and must not be broken. When it is esoteric, then people suspect that there is no method; when it is strict, then people suspect that there are methods that can be espied. However, it is indisputable that literature must have methods which come into existence naturally and cannot be altered. Furthermore, if there are no methods, how can one talk about the absence of methods?[14]

The word *fa* here is either used in the sense of "method" or "methodology" in general or in the sense of concrete "methods." Regardless of the exact meaning of the word *fa,* whether it refers to method in general or to specific rules, T'ang's emphasis on the importance of *fa* suggests that he is concerned with the formal and technical aspects of literature as well as the training of the writer.

It should be pointed out that in advocating imitating the ancients both the Ch'in-Han and T'ang-Sung Schools mention the concept of *fa,* although their interpretations of the word *fa* are different.[15] To the Ch'in-Han School, the concept of *fa* implies an emphasis on the personal styles of the writers of the Ch'in and Han. Since personal style is invisible, it has to be sought in the language and phraseology of the writer. Thus, in imitating the writers of the Ch'in and Han one often finds oneself obtaining the shallow while seeking the profound, and his writings, consequently, are of inferior quality. To the T'ang-sung School, however, the concept of *fa* suggests that there are strict and definite methods in the prose writings of the masters of the T'ang and Sung which can be followed. Thus, if one can observe these particular methods and practice long enough, one can emulate the ancients. It may be said that the imitation practiced by the Ch'in-Han School tends to be a kind of slavish imitation, while that of the T'ang-Sung School is capable of being a creative imitation. A piece of literary writing, in T'ang's opinion, is a coherent and congruous unity. It cannot be without the four elements such

as *t'i* (form), *chih* (idea), *ch'i* (vitality), and *yün* (resonance or personal tone).[16]

As suggested before, the concern with formal and technical aspects of literature and the emphasis on the concept of *fa,* a common feature of the critical ideas of the Former Seven Masters and T'ang Shun-chih in his early years, are akin to the emphasis on the methods of moral cultivation, especially the doctrine of the investigation of things, of the Cheng-Chu School. With the problem of moral mind or moral cultivation as one of his central interests, Chu Hsi, like other Neo-Confucianists, analyzed the mind from psychological, ontological and axiological points of view and differentiated the mind into many different faculties or functions.[17] Similarly, he made many distinctions in regard to the ways of moral cultivation or the moral task of man. For instance, the way of moral cultivation corresponding to the inner mind or the unexpressed part of the mind is called *hang-yang* or *ts'un-yang,* meaning self-nourishment and self-preservation, and the one corresponding to the outer mind or the expressed part of the mind is none other than the investigation of things for the extension of knowledge about the principles of things. In the light of these examples, it is perhaps not too far fetched to suggest that the emphasis of the Cheng-Chu School on the methods of moral cultivation must have inspired T'ang and other critics to regard *fa* central to their critical thinking.

After the age of forty, under the influence of the left wing of the Wang Yang-ming School led by Wang Chi (1498-1583), not only T'ang's writing style but also his literary theory showed a marked change. All of his discussions of literature since then bear clear resemblance to Wang Chi's philosophical ideas. T'ang even openly acknowledged his intellectual debt to Wang Chi as he said that he was only short of performing the kowtow ceremony to Wang Chi as his teacher.[18] Also, the affinity between T'ang and Wang Yang-ming and Wang Chi can be seen in T'ang's description of *liang-chih* or innate knowledge:

> It is something which embodies spirituality and intelligence and penetrates heaven and earth. When a man is born he cannot bring along with him anything, and yet this very thing came along with him. When a man dies he cannot take anything along with him, and yet this very thing will return by itself. [19]

The indestructability of *liang-chih* seems to be far more eloquently described here than many of the similar descriptions in Wang Yang-mings *Ch'uan-hsi*

lu (Instructions for Practical Living).

The most important thing in literature, according to T'ang, is *pen-se* (true or original colors). In a letter to his friend Mao K'un, T'ang writes:

> As far as a writer is concerned, although with respect to the disposition and arrangement of a literary composition, as well as the writing style, whether orthodox or unorthodox, changed or deviating, he can have specific rules and teachings to follow. As for the invisible parts of the writing such as its spirit, life, and marrow, unless the writer has cleansed his heart, stands independently of external objects, and possesses an insightful eye, seeing through both ancient and present , he will never attain the mastery of these qualities.
>
> Now, suppose that there are two people. One of them has a transcending mind and is the so-called person possessing an insightful eye seeing through both ancient and present times.
>
> Even if he never held a piece of paper or a brush or pored over books to learn to write, he simply relies on his own feelings or thoughts to write freely, as if composing a letter to his family. His writing might be sketchy or unrefined, it definitely has no vulgar, worldly, hackneyed or pedantic air. It is simply the excellent writing of the world.
>
> The other person is still just like a man of the world of dust. Although he has single-mindedly learned to write, and in the so-called regulations and execution of writing he is correct in every way, no matter which way he turns, what he writes is no more than the chattering of an old lady. Looking for his true spirit and ever-lasting and ineradicable views, none are to be found. Thus, although his writing might be artistically refined, it cannot but be considered as writing of inferior quality. This is what I mean by the "original colors" of literature.[20]

The concept of *pen-se* obviously implies the following: sincerity and truthfulness in feeling, genuineness or originality of idea, and non-artificiality or naturalness in individual style. A successful piece of composition must have true feelings and genuine ideas as its substance or content; it must also have its individual style. On the other hand, a man without real feelings and sincere ideas, no matter how hard he has studied the rules and methods of literature, will never be able to write good literature. Therefore, sincerity, truthfulness, genuineness, and individuality become the criteria for literary creation and evaluation.

Pen-se, as understood in referring to the genuiness or originality of ideas, is neither confined to any particular philosophical school nor determined by the profundity or sophistication of the idea. Any thought or idea, as long as it is genuine and sincere, will contribute to the acquisition of *pen-se* of a literary composition. With a much broader view than that of most of the Neo-Confucianists of his time regarding the interpretation of *Tao,* T'ang continues to elaborate on the second aspect of *pen-se*:

> Furthermore, the writings of the two Han dynasties and those which follow are not as good as those of ancient times. Was this because of the fact that the rules and regulations governing literary writing and style were not as refined as before the Ch'in and the Han?
>
> Those of the Confucian School had the original colors of the Confucian School. Those of the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu School had the original colors of the School of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu. Those of the School of politicians and Diplomatists had the original colors of the School of Politicians and Diplomatists. As for the School of Names, the Mohist School, and the Yin-yang School, they all had their respective original colors. Although, as teachings and methods, the teachings of these schools are very mixed and variagated, yet none of them were not without some everlasting views. Therefore, the School of Lao Tzu was certainly not willing to plagarize the theories of the Confucians, and the School of Politicians and Diplomatists was certainly not willing to borrow from the teachings of the Mohist School. Each school was based on its own original colors and voiced its own philosophy in its own writings. What they said is their true colors and, therefore, instilled with brilliant quintessence. Consequently, thier words will not disappear from the world.
>
> Since the T'ang and Sung times there weren't any literary men who did not talk about human nature and fate and discourse upon the principles of governance. Their writings, although flowery and in all cases under the name of Confucianism, are not the result of moral cultivation and spiritual accumulation, and indeed have no everlasting and inerasable views. They are merely the echoes and plagaries of others' words that are used to cover their heads and hide their tails. In so doing they are just like poor people borrowing rich people's clothes and farmers

> wearing the ornaments of big merchants. Although they made extraordinary efforts to pretend, their deficiencies in writing are readily revealed. Therefore, their writings lack brilliant quintessence and before long all have vanished from the earth.[21]

It is not necessary or true that only Confucianist ideas have *pen-se.* All other philosophical schools in fact also have their individual *pen-se.* T'ang's expansive or liberal attitude towards the other philosophical schools also resembles Wang Chi's heroic but much criticized attempt at a synthesis of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism in the later development of his philosophical system.

In order to appreciate the full significance of T'ang's concept of *pen-se,* we must place it in the whole context of the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming and his disciple Wang Chi. Or, as Wellek urges, we shall try to unravel the philosophical assumptions behind T'ang's critical ideas. The problem of moral mind or moral cultivation, as has been stated before, is common to both the Cheng-Chu School and the Wang Yang-ming School, although their approaches and emphases are different. In expounding his theory of the realization of *liang-chih* or innate knowledge, Wang Yang-ming imparted to his students the so-called teaching of four sentences:

> Beyond the distinction between good and evil is the original substance of mind. There exists either good or evil in the motivation of the will. To know good and evil is the function of innate knowledge. To do good and to avoid evil is the investigation of things.[22]

His disciples, notably Ch'ien Te-hung and Wang Chi, however, reached different interpretations of these four axioms. According to Wang Chi, if we say that there is neither good nor evil in the original substance of the mind, then, by logical extension, neither can such a distinction be found in will, knowledge, or in objective things. This has been known as Wang Chi's doctrine of *ssu-wu* or "four forms of non-existence," meaning the absence of good and evil in the mind, the will, knowledge, or objective things. In Wang Chi's thought, passing beyond the distinction of good and evil represents a thorough teaching for moral cultivation.[23]

Wang Chi further explained that in his discussion of the teaching of the four sentences Wang Yang-ming also said, "If one can realize that in the

original substance there is neither good nor evil, one will know that the substance of the mind has its foundation in *wu* or Nothing."[24] In other words, the original substance of the mind is Nothing, and, yet, from Nothing all will, knowledge, and things emerge. To Wang Chi, a thorough realization of Nothing as the original substance of the mind and the simultaneous realization of substance and effort amount to a direct enlightenment.[25] Compared to his teacher Wang Yang-ming, Wang Chi placed far more emphasis on the importance of direct enlightenment in moral cultivation and strongly rejected the method of accumulated effort or gradual enlightenment.

In Chinese philosophy, direct enlightenment has always been considered as an avenue to attain *Tao* or Way. Generally speaking, there are two approaches to *Tao:* one from being to Nothing, and the other from Nothing to being. According to Lo Ju-fang, another Neo-Confucianist known for his theory of the "mind of innocence," the first approach "gradually goes towards the mysterious and empty state," while the second "gradually enters into a fusion."[26] Wang Chi's direct enlightenment, as noted elsewhere, belongs to the latter because of its stress on the mind to be unobstructed and to be fused with all things, and also its immunity from the fall into emptiness and quiescence.[27] It is in essence a dynamic force which actively shows with the utmost ease the wonderful workings of Nature in contact with the world.

Furthermore, the original substance of the mind, in Wang Chi's thought, is vacuous and thus capable of holding all things and responding to their various changes.[28] Once the vacuity is realized, the mind will penetrate all things without being hampered by material desires. It will also follow a "spontaneous flow of action" without "having any attachment to existence."[29] In this way, the mind becomes "a mind without a mind." Consequently, Wang Chi concluded that the extension of *liang-chih* really means an extension of vacuity.[30]

There are many descriptions of the vacuity of the mind in Wang Chi's conversations with his students regarding the extension of *liang-chih.* All of them clearly suggest that allowing being to display its own original colors or, that is to say, allowing being to truly be what it is.[31] Just as the vacuity of the sunlight lets the colors of things show through as they are, the vacuity of the mind will let all individual ideas, volitions, and things to display their true colors. It is in Wang Chi's theory of the mind with vacuity and naturalness as its essence that we can find the philosophical assumptions of T'ang Shun-chih's concept of *pen-se.*

T'ang's eventual rejection of *fa* as an important concept in his literary criticism can be explained by another idea of Wang Yang-ming which was further developed by Wang Chi. In affirming that "Nature is Principle," the Cheng-chu School seems to take a position in which man strives to achieve Principle or the substance of mind through external effort or self-cultivation; while the Lu-Wang School in affirming that "Mind is Principle" seems to take a position in which man applies himself directly to the substance of the mind itself. The substance of mind in Wang Yang-ming's philosophy is nothing but the innate knowledge. As long as one can extend one's innate knowledge, there is no need for extraneous efforts or methods suggested by the Cheng-Chu School. To Wang Yang-ming, substance and effort or self-cultivation are not separate or different; they are fundamentally one. Once one realizes the oneness of substance and effort, one may call effort substance and vice versa. The theory of identification of substance and effort or self-cultivation perhaps contributes to T'ang's reticence towards *fa* in his later years.

In his discussion of *pen-se*, T'ang frequently made reference to the term *t'ien-chi* (the Secret of Nature or the latent spiritual capacity), and attached great importance to it. In one place he writes:

> The Secret of Nature is what is endowed by Heaven. What is endowed by Heaven is what is employed by Heaven. Therefore, what is endowed by Heaven is Nature. To establish what is endowed by Heaven depends on man. The task of man is nothing but to establish what is endowed by Heaven.[33]

It is quite clear that T'ang subscribed to the Lu-Wang School's dictum of "establishing the Greatest" in moral cultivation. In Wang Yang-ming's system, this "Greatest" is identified with the innate knowledge which, in turn, is the substance of the mind. If one can extend his innate knowledge, he is, figuratively speaking, on his way to becoming a sage.

When transported to the domain of literature, *ti'en-chi* as an "incipient and activating force of the mind" is of utmost importance for literary creation. The mind is principle and encompasses the entire universe, Moreover, the original substance of the mind transcends both good and evil in the ordinary moral sense. If a writer can express himself through true feelings and genuine ideas or, in other words, let his mind flow freely and naturally, then what he writes must be by logical implication good literature. To put it differently, good literature, in T'ang's opinion, must be the natural

flowings of the original mind.

We have so far traced the philosophical foundations of some of T'ang Shun-chih's critical ideas. It is in the concept of *pen-se* that T'ang distinguished himself from other prose writers and literary theorists of his time.[34] While many of his contemporaries still sought artistry in language or followed the doctrine of imitating the ancients, T'ang turned his attention to the problem of the content of literature and charted a different course in critical thinking.

It is well known that the neoclassical movement in prose of the T'ang-Sung period is twofold in nature: on one hand, it was concerned with the form or style of prose and, on the other hand, perhaps even more importantly, with the revival of Confucian ideas. The latter concern finally resulted in the emergence of Neo-Confucianism. By the Ming dynasty most of the critics only focused on the former aspect of the neoclassical movement in prose while neglecting the importance of philosophical ideas, or simply ideas of originality, as the content of literature. In demanding true ideas and genuine feelings as well as natural and spontaneous ways of expression, T'ang's concept of *pen-se* inaugurated a new trend in prose writing which dominated for the remainder of the Ming and early Ch'ing periods. Of equal importance to the field of literary criticism, the concept of *pen-se* not only provided the most effective refutation to the doctrine of imitating the ancients, but also, together with its subsidiary ideas and fertile implications, anticipated many of the critical ideas later developed by the prominent kung-an and Ching-Ling Schools.

Notes

1. René Wellek, "Literary Criticism and Philosophy: A Letter," in Eric Bentley,ed., *The Importance of Scrutiny* (New York: New York University Press, 1964), p.23
2. F.R. Leavis, "Literary Criticism and Philosophy: A Reply," ibid., pp. 30-34.
3. René Wellek and Austin Warren, *Theory of Literature* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1956), p.111.
4. Ibid., pp. 113-14.
5. Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 654.
6. Wing-tsit Chan, trans. *Instructions for Practical Living by Wang Yang-ming (New* York: Columbia University Press. 1963), p. xx.
7. Jung Chao-tsu, *Ming-tai ssu-hsiang shih* [The Intellectual History of Ming Dynasty] (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1962), pp. 81-87. Also see Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, pp. 654-55.

8. Arkai Kengo, "Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming," in Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 43.
9. Carson Chang, *Development of Neo-Confucian Thought,* vol. II, (New York: Bookman Associates, 1962), p. 98.
10. Kuo Shao-yü, *Chung-kuo wen-hsüeh p'i-p'ing shih* [History of Chinese Literary Criticism] (Hong Kong: Hung-chih, 1967), pp.280-86. Also see Richard John Lynn, "Orthodoxy and Enlightenment: Wang Shih-chen's Theory of Poetry and its Antecedents," in Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 231-32.
11. Liu Ta-chieh, *Chung-kuo wen-hsüeh fa chan shih* [History of the Development of Chinese Literature] (Hong Kong: ku-wen, 1967), III, p. 110.
12. Ch'ien Chi-po, *Ming-tai wen-hsüeh* [Literature of the Ming Dynasty] (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1965), p. 43. Although Mao K'un has been generally credited with first compiling the *Pa-ta-chia wen-ch'ao* [Anthology of the Eight Great Prose Masters of the T'ang-Sung Period], his selections were actually patterned after T'ang Shun-chih's *Ching-ch'uan wen-pien.*
13. Ibid., p. 44.
14. T'ang Shun-chih, "Tung Chung-feng shih-lang wen-chi hsü," [preface to Vice-Minister Tung ch'i's Collection of Writings], in *Ching-ch'uan hsien-sheng wen-ch'i* [T'ang Shun-chih's Collection of Writings], SPTK edition, hereafter cited as *CCWC,chuan* 10, p. 208. Translation is adopted from James J.Y. Liu's *Chinese Theories of Literature* (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 92.
15. Kuo Shao-yü, op. cit., p. 309.
16. Chu Tung-jun, *Chung-kuo wen-hsüeh p'i-p'ing ta-kang* [An Outline of the History of Chinese Literary Criticism] (Taipei: K'ai-ming, 1960), p. 245.
17. T'ang Chun-i, "The Development of the Concept of Moral Mind from Wang Yang-ming to Wang Chi," in Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., *Self and Society in Ming Thought* (New York: Coloumbia University Press, 1970), pp. 93-97.
18. Kuo Shao-yü, op. cit., p. 309. Two letters from T'ang to Wang Chi are still extant in the *CCWC, chüan* 5, pp. 78-80, and *chuan* 6, p. 113.
19. T'ang Shun-chih, "Ta Wang Tsun-yen," [A Peply to Mr. Wang Shen-chung], in *CCWC, chuan* 6, p. 118.
20. T'ang Shun-chih, "Ta Mao Lu-meng chih-hsien II," [A Reply to Magistrate Mao K'un, II], in *CCWC, chuan* 7, pp. 126-27.
21. Ibid., p. 127.
22. Jung Chao-tsu, op.cit., p. 111 Report of Wang Yang-ming's discussion of the teaching of the four sentences appears in Wang Chi's writings as "The Record of Confirmation of *Tao* at the Heaven Fountain Bridge," but also appears in Ch'ien Te-hung's collection of writings with slight and yet highly significant difference. Also see T'ang Chun-i, op. cit., p. 110.
23. T'ang Chun-i, op. cit., p.115.
24. Wang Chi, "T'ien-ch'üan cheng-tao chi," in *Lung-hsi hsien-sheng ch'üan-chi, chüan* 1. Quoted in Jung Chao-tsu, op. cit., p. 112.
25. Wang Chi, "Wan-ling hui-yü" in *Ming ju hsueh-an* [Philosophical Records of the Ming scholars], SPPY edition, *chuan* 12, p. 4a. Also see Takenhiko Okada, "Wang Chi and the Rise of Existentialism," in Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., *Self and Society in Ming Thought,* p. 131.
26. Lo Ju-fang, *Chin-hsi tzu chi, she,* 27-28. Quoted in Takehiko Okada, op. cit., p. 131.

27. Wang Chi, "Lu-chiang pieh-yen," in *Ming-ju hsüeh-an, chüan* 12, p. 9b. Also see Takehiko Okada, Ibid.
28. Wang Chi, "Wan-ling hui-yü," in *Ming-ju hsüeh-an, chüan,* 12, p. 4a.
29. Fung Yu-lan, *Chung-kuo ch'e-hsüeh shih* [History of Chinese Philosophy] (Hong Kong: Pacific, 1970), p. 969.
30. Wang Chi, "Lung-hua hui-yü," in *Ming-ju hsüeh-an, chüan* 12, p. 6a.
31. Wang Chi, "Ta Wu Wu-chai," in *Ming ju hsüeh-an, chüan* 12, p. 12b. .Also see Takhiko Okada, op. cit., p. 132.
32. Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., pp. 953-58.
33. T'ang Shun-chih, "Yü Nieh Shuang-chiang ssu-ma," [A Letter to Mr. Nieh Pao] in *CCWC, chüan* 6, p. 120.
34. Fang Hsiao-yüan, *Chung-kuo wen-hsüeh p'i-p'ing* [Chinese Literary Criticism] (Taipei: Ch'ing-liu Press, 1971), p. 116. Also see Fu Keng-sheng, *Chung-kuo wen-hsuen p'i-p'ing t'ung-lun* [A General Discussion of Chinese Literary Criticism] (Taipei: Hua-cheng, 1975), p. 93.