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Freud between Two Philosophies, or Psychoanalytical Transdisciplinarity

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Abstract

This article evaluates the concept of transdisciplinarity that prevails in certain sections of the theoretical humanities, with a focus on the way in which it extends the long-running antagonism between science and the humanities, and "Continental" (theoretical) philosophy and its analytic counterpart. Examining a theoretical transdisciplinary valorization of the Freudian concept of the dream and juxtaposing it with an analytic disciplinary defense of dream interpretation as a method with scientific merit, I elucidate contrasting philosophical approaches to (trans)disciplinarity and correspondingly divergent perspectives on psychoanalysis. I conclude that the theoretical discourse on transdisciplinarity (inclusive of its application to psychoanalysis) obfuscates science as its generative Other, failing to go beyond, even while criticizing, analytic philosophy's appeal to science as a positive measure of validity. Alternatively, both forms of philosophical thinking fail to account for the *ex-timate* status of science for philosophy as well as psychoanalysis. This failure ultimately makes it difficult to arrive at a genuinely productive transdisciplinarity which, as Freud's disciplinary practice demonstrated, would take precisely extimacy as its motor and praxis.

Keywords: transdiscplinarity, psychoanalysis, extimacy, science and humanities, Continental philosophy, analytic philosophy

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Transdisciplinarity as *Ex-timate* (Self-)Relation

Transdisciplinarity has been hailed as a new critical imperative for some time now, but the concept remains far from self-evident and the praxis yet to be standardized.[1] This lag may be a practical hitch that can be overcome in due time (e.g. the need to "catch up") or, as I argue, due to the very structure constitutive of the concept-praxis. The latter is sufficiently borne out by the composition of the term itself: for all its transcendent composure, "trans-" is a positionality that can only be activated from a particular "disciplinary" context. Unattended, this complication can render transdisciplinarity indistinguishable from interdisciplinarity, the aim of this last being finally quantitative insofar as *boundary* is unquestioned or merely crossed. It seems that the humanities are particularly liable for this slippage. As an interpretive method, transdisciplinarity has obvious attraction and immediate utility for the humanities, more so than for the sciences. Perhaps the notion of interpretation is already prejudiced toward the humanities; yet if confined to that disciplinary cluster, the claim of "trans-" can seem conceited. As humanistic disciplines share long and deep affinities among themselves (e.g., literature and history are distinctly narrative endeavors; and philosophy and literature share the drive towards truths), while their increasing openness to the social sciences has culminated in such pseudo-disciplines as Cultural Studies and Gender Studies, transdisciplinarity as practiced from within the humanities seems to spell out two possible outcomes: either the reduction of "trans-" to the effacement of already faint boundaries, or the end of disciplinarity *qua* disciplinary difference. If it is boundary that is at stake for trans-disciplinarity, the aim of which is moreover not to annul it, these alternatives seem far from satisfactory. Needless to say, we presume that the transitivity implied by trans-disciplinarity aspires to *more* than material, thematic, and/or methodological diversity via exchange and juxtaposition, precisely the aim of interdisciplinarity. It must then be in the nature of that supplement that we shall identify the radicality specific to transdisciplinarity. The crucial question comes to: How does transdisciplinarity approach disciplinary boundaries in a new way? Better, when "inter-" gives way to "trans-," *where* is the boundary?

In psychoanalysis we find concepts that can help us approach the tension

[1] As Peter Osborne notes, "'Inter' was the dominant prefix of the first half of the twentieth century; 'post,' the prefix *du jour* from the 1960s through to the 1990s; and now, in the last two decades, in the wake of the rapid antiquation of the 'post,' cultural theory is awash with 'trans' terms" ("Introduction" 7). Concurrent with the theoretical valorization of transdisciplinarity is the increasing dominance of "transnational" or "transregional" methods in diverse humanistic disciplines, not to mention the radical "transgender" intervention into cultural as well as academic discourse on sexuality and gender.

inherent to transdisciplinarity, i.e., between transitive positionality and disciplinary premise. Take "extimacy," Lacan's neologism for the paradoxical topology of the Other, constitutive of the subject at its kernel yet external to it: "Which other is this, then, to whom I am more attached than to myself [*moi*], since, at the most assented to heart of my identity to myself, he pulls the strings [*m'agite*]?" (Lacan, *Écrits* 436). As an extimate event, the apparent lack of transdisciplinarity, i.e., noncoincidence with itself, can be elucidated as a surplus: the disciplinary drive that exceeds disciplinary desire and thereby produces the novel desire to be other than itself—transdisciplinary. Lacan's concept of the real captures the effect of the event: "the hard stone of the real, which 'takes out' the transcendental categories and drives a hole through phenomena" (Copjec 5). The transdisciplinary discipline is riveted precisely to that part of itself which bars its transcendental aspiration, i.e., symbolic closure. When disciplines are driven through with a hole, (trans)disciplinarity cannot be "transcendental," that is, driving toward either an eventual sum of all disciplinary perspectives or a new category beyond disciplinarity. If interdisciplinarity prescribes democratic meetings of disciplines, while preserving intact or confirming afresh their respective forms ("categories" of "phenomena"), transdisciplinarity forces disciplines to be affected, transfigured, or exceeded by disciplinary encounters, which finally prove not to take place "between" (existing) disciplines but transpire as each discipline's own (continual) experience of the deadlock (the "hole") vis-à-vis the Other.

The "trans-" in transdisciplinarity thus understood does not denote the transcendence of limits *qua* bondary of the individual discipline but the latter's transfiguring, transposing, in its self-relation to the Other. Above all, it must herald, to continue in Lacan's language, the traversal of the fundamental fantasy (*qua* coordinates of disciplinary knowledge), which yet does not, and cannot, extinguish the *objet a* (*qua* possibility of disciplinary knowledge as such). That is, the discipline undergoes a subjective recognition of its own extimate status and is thereby able to position itself anew vis-à-vis its "ownmost" aspiration, logic, and method—desire, in short. Such a pursuit can no longer be a mere methodology but ought to designate an entire critical praxis *qua* drive of thought, in the same way that "after the mapping of the subject in relation to the [*objet*] *a*, the experience of the fundamental phantasy becomes the drive" (Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts* 273). Therein lies transdisciplinary radicality. Indeed, we might go so far as to say that a certain register of passivity (effects of the drive) is the very mark of transdisciplinarity. Such passivity is all the more important in the present *époque*, when the desire to include (by representing) as diverse a set of "categories" of "phenomena" as possible is redoubled and confounded by the

capitalistic logic *cum* drive to encompass all.

There is hardly any dispute as to the multidisciplinary status of Freud's psychoanalysis. Yet, any collaborative or equal exchange between disciplines (as desired in interdisciplinarity, for instance) was precisely not Freud's vision, as he argued instead for a multidisciplinarity that was singular to psychoanalysis:

> In the work of psycho-analysis links are formed with numbers of other mental sciences, the investigation of which promises results of the greatest value: links with mythology and philology, with folklore, with social psychology and the theory of religion . . . on the whole *it is psycho-analysis which provides the technical methods and the points of view whose application in these other fields should prove fruitful*. The mental life of human individuals, when subjected to psychoanalytic investigation, offers us the explanations with the help of which we are able to solve a number of riddles in the life of human communities or at least to *set them in a true light*. (Freud, *Standard Edition* XV: 167-168; my emphasis)

What at first glance seems the multidisciplinary method of one knowledge system (i.e., psychoanalysis) is in fact a supradisciplinary claim to knowledge production as such. While the former is descriptive and quantitative, the latter is loaded with epistemological aspirations. Without embracing it entirely, we can nevertheless identify a radical beginning of transdisciplinarity harbored in this claim *cum* aspirations.

An interjection is anticipated at this point. Am I not advancing a circular argument? Above, I located conceptual models of transdisciplinary praxis in psychoanalysis (i.e., the real and extimacy) and now argue that psychoanalysis has been transdisciplinary from its very inception. Indeed, this article takes as its premise that psychoanalysis is a singular model of transdisciplinarity; transdisciplinarity is the praxis inherent to psychoanalysis; psychoanalysis embodies, fulfills, transdisciplinarity *qua* novel form of production of knowledge. This demonstration finds a good starting point in the above passage. Freud does not mention "proper" sciences in the multidisciplinary list, and the reason is both obvious and complicated. He speaks from the premise that psychoanalysis is (a natural) science; yet, as is well known, it is exactly this assumption of scientific status that has exposed Freud's novel discipline to attacks ever since. Freud voices frustration in this regard:

> Imagine that someone had undertaken the chemical analysis of a certain substance and had arrived at a particular weight for one component of it—so and so many milligrammes. Certain inferences could be drawn from this weight. Now do you suppose that it would ever occur to a chemist to criticize those inferences on the ground that the isolated substance might equally have had some other weight? . . . But when you are faced with the psychical fact that a particular thing occurred to the mind of the person questioned, you will not allow the fact's validity: something else

> might have occurred to him! You nourish the illusion of there being such a thing as psychical freedom, and you will not give it up. I am sorry to say I disagree with you categorically over this. (*Standard Edition* XV: 48)

Unable yet to present the nature of his frustration in a "scientific" language, Freud goes on to impatiently and breathlessly define science *tout court*:

> It would be a mistake to suppose that a science consists entirely of strictly proved theses, and it would be unjust to require this. Only a disposition with a passion for authority will raise such a demand, someone with a craving to replace his religious catechism by another, though it is a scientific one. Science has only a few apodeictic propositions in its catechism: the rest are assertions promoted by it to some particular degree of probability. It is actually a sign of a scientific mode of thought to find satisfaction in these approximations to certainty and to be able to pursue constructive work further in spite of the absence of final confirmation. (*Standard Edition* XV: 51)

My second premise follows from these words of Freud's: it is impossible to consider psychoanalysis (*qua* transdiscipline especially) apart from the antagonism at its heart, i.e., vis-à-vis science, that it was inaugurated precisely as a disruption of (the preposition signifying extimacy) science.

Two recent texts present together an excellent point of departure for productive reevaluation of the discursive relationship between psychoanalysis and transdisciplinarity, both across the humanities and with regard to science. Stella Sandford's article "The Dream is a Fragment: Freud, Transdisciplinarity and Early German Romanticism" and Michael T. Michael's book *Freud's Theory of Dreams: A Philosophico-Scientific Perspective* appeared around the same time, with a shared interest in Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*. What makes this coincidence serendipitous is their disciplinary difference: "theory" born of "Continental" philosophy on the one hand and analytic philosophy on the other. These two differing approaches to Freud are in parallel with their concern, and the lack thereof, with disciplinarity as concept-praxis. As for theory, there has been a smooth transfer of interest from earlier "postmodernist" appropriation of psychoanalytic concepts toward deconstructive ends to the recently dominant transdisciplinary discourse claiming Freud's psychoanalysis as one of its constitutive moments. As for analytic philosophy, it consciously takes up and carries forward the disciplinary discourse on Freudian psychoanalysis, the point of contention being whether it should be considered "science" understood as a self-sufficient epistemologico-disciplinary regime.

It is useful first to examine Sandford's article via the larger research project on transdisciplinary within which it was written, as a way of examining one representative definition of the concept currently in circulation. I will argue that this theoretical philosophical discourse attenuates the status of science as

the humanities' disciplinary Other and, by the same token, effaces the transdisciplinarity singularly characteristic of Freudian psychoanalysis, namely, its (self-)relation to science *qua* extimate Other. This first part of the discussion already anticipates the limits of analytic philosophy's disciplinary vision, which Michael's book illuminates with its aim of measuring Freud's psychoanalysis against the yardstick of science. In the end, I claim, both philosophical approaches fall short to the extent that they fail to account for the desire (and anxiety) that Freud's psychoanalysis sustained vis-à-vis science, producing the inherently transdisciplinary drive of its thought. This psychoanalytical oversight *par excellence*, that is, transdisciplinary disavowal (across theoretical and analytic philosophy) of the transdisciplinary desire *cum* drive of psychoanalysis, is of great consequence. For it is precisely this tarrying at the frontier of (signifying extimacy once again) science, divulging the real of the disciplinary law, that ought to be at stake for transdisciplinary knowledge today.

The aim of the following discussion is to intervene in the contemporary election of Freudian psychoanalysis as a transdisciplinary model rather than to explain psychoanalytical transdisciplinarity as such; that the one serves the other is a supplementary gain and we cannot presume to deliver it to any project of propagation.[2] For Lacan, what psychoanalysis yields at the level of analytical treatment as well as training cannot be talked about as "all" but only "scattered mismatched subjects" (Soler, 154). Colette Soler elaborates: "It is impossible for analysts, insofar as they are analysts, to constitute a group" (155). Likewise, taken as the disciplinary subject's (or discipline's subjective) recognition of extimacy and what this spells out for the production of knowledge, transdisciplinarity must ever operate as single/singular instances. Any institutional project in the name of transdisciplinarity needs ever to be alert to this structural tension. This is a matter of fidelity—of theory arising as praxis arising as theory *ad infinitum*. We are at a critical juncture (in the order of crisis) where, by all accounts, it has never been easier to resort to (the most) obvious, reasonable, or accessible explanations, and yet psychoanalysis is anything but obvious, reasonable, or accessible. The process of confirming afresh why psychoanalysis can only work from a rough spot, unmoored from institutional guarantee, cannot be inconsequential but rather indicates the real kernel of its disciplinary truth. This is not to deny the institutional status of psychoanalysis, but merely to highlight how it manifests as (trans)disciplinary trouble.

[2] Indeed, the proper status of "trans-" is akin to the Derridean supplement: "As substitute, it [the supplement] is not simply added to the positivity of a presence, it produces no relief, its place assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness" (Derrida 145).

Scientificity Alienated from Science

Sandford's article appeared as part of "Transdisciplinarity and the Humanities: Problems, Methods, Histories, Concepts," a multi-year project located within the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy at Kingston University London (hereafter, "the Project"); and, as such, some words on the Project will be helpful in contextualizing it.[3] For the clearest indication of the Project's overall conceptual and ideological operation, it is best to turn to the contributions by its leader Peter Osborne. It bears emphasis, however, that my purpose is not to argue that all contributions to the Project share the same view of transdisciplinarity, but to illuminate one distinct trajectory of thought connecting Osborne and Sandford relevant to the present interest in psychoanalysis.

In a special double issue of *Theory, Culture & Society* dedicated to the Project, Osborne's introductory essay proposes to "[offer] a brief typology and history of established conceptions of transdisciplinarity within science and technology studies," then "raise the question of the conceptual structure of transdisciplinary generality in the humanities" ("Problematizing" 3). Important to note is Osborne's starting point: "science and technology studies," that is, a secondary discourse on these fields already situated within the so-called "human sciences." In this sense, the keywords "science," "technology," and the "humanities" fall short of giving rise to proper conflicts and tensions. When addressing science as such, it is once again as a concept defined by the discursive coordinates of the humanities. For what Osborne ultimately aims to demonstrate is the epistemological and methodological evolution whereby

> the generality of the concept of science, theoretically constituted via the philosophical sub-discipline of the epistemology of science [came to be] the motor of the transformation of a range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences . . . via the alternatively trans- and meta-disciplinary ('doctrinal') concept of 'structure.' (7)

Osborne's discussion thus never touches on the transdisciplinary contact of science and the humanities as distinct and antagonistic disciplinarities, even while arguing that the humanistic "transdisciplinarity" obtained its prototypical and soon essential paradigm from (the natural) science(s) (16-17). The trouble is that, as long as this singular significance of "trans-," actualized as

[3] For related publications, see the special double issue of *Theory, Culture & Society* 32 (5-6); and the two-part dossier in *Radical Philosophy* 196 and 198.

"scientificity," persists as the condition of the possibility of the transdisciplinary humanities, the latter's disciplinary claim to transdisciplinarity cannot but contain science precisely as the Other of the humanities. While admitting that "[t]ransposed into the context of the humanities and social studies, this concept of science posed new problems for disciplinarity," Osborne finds the ultimate virtue of the "transformative dynamic of this concept of science" in its philosophical bearings: "the centrality of the question of the relationship of transdisciplinarity to philosophy, and the philosophical critique of disciplinary philosophy, in particular" (18). Our question then has to be the transdisciplinary value of this self-reflexivity of philosophy.

Osborne positions the philosophy that the Project envisions largely in distinction from four other discursive entities. First, he surveys and critiques the "established discourse of transdisciplinarity [which is] overwhelmingly positive and organizational," as well as "a discourse of the state," and which "lacks an account of the internal dynamics of specifically transdisciplinary concepts—or concepts in their transdisciplinary functioning" (13-14). This is, in short, a discourse exterior to philosophy. Secondly, the French structuralist discourse, the mainspring of the generalized scientific concept of structure, encompassing the humanistic disciplines including philosophy, is found problematic insofar as it "implicitly aspires to the status of a transdisciplinary discourse (call it 'science') yet . . . faces the danger of performing a meta-disciplinary role, which is indifferent to the specificities of the disciplines it crosses"; it is a case of "*re-disciplinarizing* dynamics, which subject de-disciplinarizing initiatives to existing institutional and conceptual forms" (21; 5). This is the point where Osborne identifies Foucault's and Derrida's achievement of "retain[ing] something of the post-philosophical generality of the structuralist problematic while avoiding falling back into becoming a 'new transcendental philosophy,'" as well as Félix Guattari, with whom "transdisciplinarity becomes explicitly thematized in French thought" (22). How to avoid meta-disciplinarization or re-disciplinarization while allowing for transdisciplinary thematization particular to the discipline of philosophy would seem to be the crux of the matter. Thirdly, "an English-language philosophy that, in the course of the 20th century, largely retreated into a self-imposed analytical isolation," is singled out as the bad O/other of theoretical philosophy (16). Finally, the Project positions itself at an ambiguous distance from German philosophy, as Osborne comments on "the 'German' problem of philosophy's dialectical relations to its nonphilosophical others" (21) even while allowing that "the conceptual form of transdisciplinarity most appropriate to the arts and humanities [might] be something structurally akin to that of early Romanticism itself" (Osborne, "Introduction" 6).

In sum, each of the first two categories—"established" state-directed and structuralist "meta-disciplinary" discourses—fails, in Osborne's view, to arrive at, or stay within, "philosophy." The last two are then essentially "philosophical" versions of these institutional misfires: analytic philosophy is too positivist, while German philosophy is too transcendental. How can contemporary transdisciplinary philosophy proceed from these negations? Osborne's proposal rests on two core claims. First, it shall take

> interest in how concepts with sufficient generality to address basic societal problems actually function transdisciplinarily across the disciplinary terrains from which they draw, linking the discourses of different disciplines together through nondisciplinary problems, and *transforming the meaning of their basic concepts*, in a manner quite different from any merely interdisciplinary engagements. (Osborne, "Problematizing" 14)

Having learned from structuralism's example, Osborne is aware of the potential danger of the actuality of "across" instituting a meta-disciplinary dominance. But there is a solution: "This danger can be countered only by a strict immanence in the construal of the 'trans-' (the *movement* across disciplines). . . Such immanence means that concepts are *retrospectively, artificially* and *temporarily* grasped in their unity, qua concepts" (21). If this solution seems still vague, even merely disciplinary (i.e., philosophical), there is an answer to that too: "The problem of what appears as a strictly philosophical—meaning a 'purely' conceptual—universality thus cannot be dissolved empirically, but is rather re-posed and rendered more complicated." This proposal comes close to being an article of faith: disciplinary repetition would somehow produce transdisciplinary effects. In sum, Osborne commits two mutually contradictory errors. On the one hand, this privileging of concepts is already, thoroughly, a disciplinary imposition arising from within theoretical philosophy. More importantly, the transdisciplinary "immanence" that Osborne envisions is predicated on the disavowal of the primary immanence of concepts, whose utility, inclusive of the transdisciplinary kind, is attained precisely by virtue of disciplinary conditions. Osborne might argue for "'subject' and 'person,' for example, the meaning of the generality of which must be produced transdisciplinarily, across the domains of philosophy, economics, law, anthropology, religious studies and psychoanalysis—to name only the main disciplinary instances" (20). Yet, how is such a production of concepts possible? Indeed, why must these concepts, grounded in all their complexities specific to disciplinary problematics, now submit to an abstraction, one dictated moreover by a single discipline? In short, the conceptual procedure as advocated by Osborne submits the transitive movement intrinsic to transdisciplinarity to the promise of a generality, with the

consequence that philosophical immanence becomes the condition for imminent transdisciplinarity.

I have thus identified two problems with Osborne's vision for the Project. First, while defining scientificity *qua* transdisciplinary generality (with "structure" as the concept-structure that embodies the latter and thereby defines "theory") as the basis of philosophical transdisciplinarity, it leaves science's (extimate) relation to philosophy unaddressed. Secondly, it concludes that theoretical philosophy, thus equipped, provides "concepts" as the ultimate sites of transdisciplinarity, marked as they are by philosophy's disciplinary dominance and de-realized through the divorce of various disciplinary actualities (including analytic philosophy). Transdisciplinarity thus increasingly looks like a project of purification.

At this point, Howard Caygill's contribution to the Project provides an enlightening alternative to Osborne's framework, approaching philosophy by way of science at the origin of philosophical transdisciplinarity. Tracing the way in which classical rhetoric came to transform philosophy, Caygill notes, "it might be the case that philosophy could assume what can retrospectively be described as its transdisciplinary vocation only in so far as it was no longer philosophy but rhetoric in the process of assuming the form of philosophy" (Caygill 9). Transdisciplinarity *qua* philosophical truth is thus from the outset identified as philosophy's temporal as well as categorical noncoincidence with itself. Moreover, rhetoric's simultaneously supplementary and constitutive relation to philosophy bears out the palpable presence of science in the contemporary discursive space:

> The invention of a discourse on the invention of discourses—one that invents its own content, disposes its own disposition and articulates its own elocution—became characteristic of Jena Romanticism, appearing under various guises . . . It became closely associated with poiesis and creativity, mobilizing a term drawn from Longinus's *On the Sublime* that had its own peculiar migration, becoming the core of nineteenth- and twentieth-century science: *energy*. (11-12)

Caygill leaves the chronology appropriately ambiguous (is energy first a scientific or philosophical concept?), given that the turn-of-the-19th century intellectual discourse in general was awash with appeals to energy; and hence one historian's suggestion: "The historian, rather than searching for parallels which might indicate influences [between physical sciences and Romanticism], should perhaps content himself with expositions, and might be well advised to explore the way in which certain terms, such as *force, power, energy, dynamical, etherial*, *hypothesis*, and *system* were employed in the thirty years or so either side of 1800" (Knight 55).

Michael Friedman provides a comprehensive account of the impact of Newton's physics on Kant's metaphysics but, once again, the idea of "impact" is far from straightforward, indeed suggestive of extimacy. Kant's argument in *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* is amply indicative:

> [Metaphysics] is dismayed that with so much offered to it by pure mathematics it can still accomplish so little. Nevertheless, this small amount is still something that even mathematics unavoidably requires in its application to natural science; and thus, since it must here necessarily borrow from metaphysics, it need also not be ashamed to let itself be seen in community with the latter. (Friedman 15)

What we confirm here is how modern philosophy *qua* Kantian metaphysics commenced as a kind of protest vis-à-vis science, i.e., taking the Other as the premise of its claim to ontological priority. As Friedman argues, "The *Metaphysical Foundations* is centrally implicated in the important changes Kant made between the first and second editions of the *Critique* [*of Pure Reason*]," which are articulated in the appendix to the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, succinctly titled "On what can be done to make metaphysics as a science actual," responding to a highly critical review that had dismissed the first edition as "a version of psychological or subjective Berkeleyean idealism" (2). The central argument concerns the "mechanical laws of motion" which are "revealed to be (synthetic) a priori principles governing the (true or actual) motion of matter," which then authenticates the "relationship between metaphysics and mathematical natural philosophers" (21). Kant concludes, "Hence all natural philosophers who have wished to proceed mathematically in their occupation have always, and must have always, made use of metaphysical principles (albeit unconsciously), even if they themselves solemnly guarded against all claims of metaphysics upon their science" (16).

With Jena Romanticism, meanwhile, philosophy's appeal to energy culminates in the "fusion of the rhetorical schema of invention/disposition and elocution with the philosophical distinction between sensible and rational knowledge to produce a transdisciplinary machine for producing theoretical discourses of existing and novel practices" (Caygill 11). Transdisciplinarity thus characterized as a drive ("machine") rather than desire (e.g., elected method) suggests an extimate operation at the heart of philosophy's self-invention, at once elevating and relativizing philosophy's disciplinary prestige *qua* transdisciplinary origin. Put differently, transdisciplinary philosophy's prestige originates precisely from this capacity to harbor the Other (i.e., rhetoric, science, and their fusional impetus) as *passion*. Yet, it seems to be F. W. J. Schelling's narrowly (disciplinary) philosophical vision that has come to exert a lasting discursive force: "[I]t is philosophy [. . .] that is not only autonomous but tends also to become the principle of

every autonomy" (qtd. in Caygill 12).[4] This corresponds to Osborne's vision of contemporary transdisciplinary philosophy, which prescribes the eminently philosophical concept of "concept" as the basis of transdisciplinarity for all of the humanities. Overall then, Jena Romanticism seems to have raised philosophy to its transdisciplinary status precisely by presenting it as the "invention of invention" or the *true* engine of "energy," the fundamental material-concept of modern science.

In sum, insofar as represented by Osborne's argument, the Project's advocacy for the contemporary transdisciplinary humanities as a philosophical endeavor harbors a certain historical duplicity. Transdisciplinary theoretical (as opposed to analytic) philosophy, firstly, found its origin in Jena Romanticism which, as we have seen, displays a deep affinity *cum* contention with science (i.e., extimacy), yet all the while overwrites it with philosophy's new truth *cum* vocation; secondly, deradicalized science, rhetorically and methodologically co-opting the alterity of science as its own radical difference (i.e., "generality" of "scientificity"); and finally, named this last "transdisciplinarity," the point of its disciplinary consummation, now available as the "conceptual" praxis for all of the humanities. According to this genealogy, the more the philosophical humanities evolve to manifest their truth, i.e., become transdisciplinary, the less difference remains among disciplines within the humanities, while the difference between the humanities and science deepens until it is finally hidden from the view of transdisciplinary projects, which are consequently all the more confined to the humanities.

Science in Freud's Psychoanalysis

This is an apposite point at which to reintroduce Freud. It is now conventional to characterize the earliest days of psychoanalysis as an ultimately failed effort to make psychology scientific. Freud's *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (hereafter *PSP*), incomplete and only posthumously published, stands as evidence for this view. Freud framed his intention for the *PSP* to "furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is, to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles," acknowledging that the gap separating psychology and science is of an epistemological order

[4] Walter D. Wetzels cites Novalis, who "sharply disapproved of the cavalier fashion with which Schelling frequently treated complex chemical or physical phenomena" and "called this type of philosophizing […] a 'scientific prostitution'" (49).

(*Standard Edition* I: 295). The disciplinary desire to surmount the epistemological difference is a real challenge because it goes beyond the scope of any objective project to a subjective unveiling, repositioning, of *objet a*. His later disavowal—"I no longer understand the state of mind in which I hatched the psychology"—cannot be taken as a mere capitulation to, and as such further confirmation of, the incommensurability between psychology and science (Freud, *Complete Letters* 152). Siegfried Zepf's persuasive thesis holds that it was finally the "mode of operation" *qua natura naturata* of the unconscious and not the materiality *qua natura naturans* of "energy" (e.g., neuronal "Q" in PSP) that allowed Freud to claim a scientific status for psychoanalysis (162). Yet, even this "scientific" qualification only reveals the status of the unconscious as more, or less, than an object of inquiry. For all its structural similarity to natural laws, is it not true that the unconscious could not finally be granted a scientific status? Freud reflected on the reason later in his life: "Every science is based on observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our psychical apparatus. But since our science [of psychology] has as its subject that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here" (*Standard Edition* XXIII: 159). The unconscious was an unprecedented type of object and as such could not be fit into the existing epistemic system, even less a scientific discipline. No wonder then that Freud's state of mind in penning *PSP* could have been nothing less than "madness" (Freud, *Complete Letters* 152).

The epistemological challenge is inseparable from the problem of language; and this is fully exemplified in *PSP*, that is, even before the unconscious emerges as a central concept-object. In his originally untitled manuscript, Freud resolved to illuminate the neurons as quantities of energy with psychical significance. The early parts, explaining the quantitative dynamic, have the sure stamp of the objective, systematic, and logical language of science. Yet, his certainty begins to falter once the discussion enters the arena of psychology. A case in point is Freud's use of the example of infantile needs. The earliest reference is straightforward. Speaking of the "experience of satisfaction," taking as an example the satisfying of hunger, Freud states, "It takes place by *extraneous help*, when the attention of an experienced person is drawn to the child's state by discharge along the path of internal change. In this way this path of discharge acquires a secondary function of the highest importance, that of *communication*, and the initial helplessness of human beings is the *primal source* of all *moral motives*" (*Standard Edition* I: 318). However, with the introduction of memory and wish, two of the terms that would eventually define psychoanalysis, Freud begins to resort to images, imagination, and indeed cinematic identification to supplement the scientific language ordered by cause and effect:

> Let us suppose, for instance, that the mnemic image wished for [by a child] is the image of the mother's breast and a front view of its nipple, and that the first perception is a side view of the same object, without the nipple. In the child's memory there is an experience, made by chance in the course of sucking, that with a particular head-movement the front image turns into the side image. The side image which is now seen leads to the [image of the] head-movement; an experiment shows that its counterpart must be carried out, and the perception of the front view is achieved. (*Standard Edition* I: 328-329)

The subsequent section on psychopathology goes further to center on the case of a woman named Emma, which Freud introduces with obvious sheepishness: "Now, as it happens, there is a special psychical constellation in the sexual sphere which might be of service for our purpose. I will illustrate it (it is known to us empirically) by an example" (353).

What these examples demonstrate is that *PSP*'s failure is a failure of language, i.e., the question of how to (re)present the new object that even, or precisely, in the movement of this failure comes into being. Put differently, the range of Freud's language, from arithmetic to narrative, testifies to the real aim of his project, namely, the production of a new object, which amounts to the creation of a new scientific language. Recall Freud's now famous vexation: "[It] still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science" (*Standard Edition* II: 160). Correctly, he blames "the nature of the subject," which we might now define as a kind of hole that psychoanalysis opened in the existing science and its language: the contemporary semantics of energy was incapable of accommodating the psyche, for instance (160). Importantly, however, it is precisely this gap between the (yet-to-be-) object and language that can represent it that already, nonetheless, initiates, even most forcefully manifests, the object's real-ity *qua* pressure on language. In other words, the antagonism of that gap breaks the inertia of the symbolic habitude, and thus inaugurates an *other* trajectory (of discourse) of science. It is the "tension between [Freud's] clinical data and scientific ideals" that birthed psychoanalysis as a discipline that could *only* be a transdiscipline (Talvitie et al., 55). Here then lies the danger of designating "concept" as the ultimate concept, to recall Osborne's advocacy for an "account of the internal dynamics of specifically transdisciplinary concepts" ("Problematizing" 14). My claim is that if we look for "specifically transdisciplinary concepts" we will never find them, because it is precisely the (yet-to-be-) disciplinary object that activates the (always already) transdisciplinary vocation of concepts; and it is a disciplinary responsibility *par excellence* to stay faithful to the transdisciplinary temporality which persists even in the most established

discipline.

It is unsurprising that energy or the general quantitative and mechanical premise of science in the early conception of *PSP* receded from the foreground of psychoanalytic purview.[5] Freud's original ambition to negotiate—democratically and reasonably—the new object and the existing scientific language was too modest for the nature of the event. Psychoanalysis began in earnest, we might say, once Freud was able to take in stride the *madness* of the new knowledge, akin to what Slavoj Žižek noted regarding the "exceptional status of Plato, Descartes and Hegel": "in each case, we are dealing with a philosophical Event in the sense of a traumatic intrusion of something New which remains unacceptable for the predominant view" (Žižek 70). In sum, Freud's psychoanalysis, from its most abject failure to its most memorable success, tarries with the materiality of the concept (e.g., energy in its functional insufficiency) that appears first in the encounter with the conceptuality of the object (e.g., the psyche lacking representation). Science is both the destination and the trouble encountered *en route*; and psychoanalysis is formed as the actuality of the distance in between, i.e., a transdiscipline.

Dream as Fragment, Psychoanalysis as Concept

Sandford's article differentiates two possibilities of reading the "fragmentary" status of the Freudian concept of the dream, that is, how Freud "equivocates" between them ("The Dream" 25). On the one hand, the "archaeological model" contrasts the fragmentary dream *qua* "manifest content" against "dream thoughts," which are latent yet can be made to appear in their complete meaning, i.e., "wish," through interpretation. Accordingly, "the relation between dream and interpretation . . . is not unlike that of the relation [sic] between error and correction. The dream as dreamed is something to be overcome" (32). This constitutes "the *disciplinary* psychoanalytic concept of the dream in *The Interpretation of Dreams*." On the other hand, is the dream in the sense of the early "Romantic concept of the fragment," which Sandford favors unambiguously (25). In the same way that the Romantic "fragment projects the system" such that

[5] This is not to say that the energetic concern *qua* rhetoric disappeared. From the concept of the id, which "knows no judgments of value" but is dominated by "[the] economic or, if you prefer, the quantitative factor"; to "the quantitative factors of the illnesses," which, he hoped, "our knowledge of the operation of the hormones . . . may give us the means of successfully combating," Freud continued to prod and coax it, so to speak, no longer focusing on "proving" its applicability but as if nursing the originary trauma it preserved (*Standard Edition* XXII: 74; 154).

"its finitude is a negative reference to the infinite; its completion carries within it a reference to incompletion," the dream is no longer a "false front" or *mere* fragment(s) of a thing, i.e., wish *qua* meaning, but is rather "the thing" itself (27; 32). Furthermore, insofar as dream-work is already interpretation, and thus "the dream remains enigmatic and strange, even after all attempts at interpretation and translation," the interpretation of a dream "becomes a fragment in its own right" (30; 32). Simultaneously, Sandford privileges psychoanalysis over Jena Romanticism: psychoanalysis enables "the dream, complete in its incompletion" to emerge in an "essential kinship" with the Romantic notion of "literary fragment," all the while "[freeing] the concept of the fragment from any disciplinary confinement," that is, of literature (31). Thus, we are led to suppose, psychoanalysis presents a purer realization of the concept.

Sandford, in short, juxtaposes and sublimates two limits. First, Jena Romanticism invented a transdisciplinary concept of the fragment but, disappointingly, located the fragment within the disciplinary confines of literature. Second, Freud's concept of the dream is divided between the good transdisciplinary part and the bad disciplinary part. Rather than taking the psychoanalytical path of illuminating how these apparent opposites (inherent limits) collude to produce symptomatic pleasure (*jouissance* of knowledge), as one might expect in the context, Sandford picks out the (conceptually) unlimited, i.e., transdisciplinary, aspects out of the limited disciplinary situations (of the respective concepts) and thereby constructs an ideal transdisciplinary concept: dream *qua* fragment. In this sense, Sandford's transdisciplinary enthusiasm is for purifying the concept of the fragment and thereby rendering it displaceable across varying disciplines. Put differently, the concept must first lose its original disciplinary contexts, where, as I have argued, it emerged in its inherent transdisciplinary drive. This appears to be an exemplary practice of the "transdisciplinary concept" that Osborne advocates.

To approach the matter from another angle, even while acknowledging that "'Literature' in this [Romantic] sense may not be a strictly disciplinary term," Sandford insists, "yet the idea of the fragment is nonetheless confined in *The Literary Absolute* to its [literature's] embrace," and ends by overstating the thesis of the famed study by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy: "'literature . . . is Romantic philosophy" (Sandford 25: 26). Lost in this reading is "the continually 'satiric' or 'ironic' relation between philosophy and 'Literature,'" which is precisely the source of fascination of Jena Romanticism, and the

book's target accordingly (Pfau, "Review" 309).[6] Sandford thus shares Osborne's disavowal of philosophy's disciplinary status: "Transdisciplinary concept-construction is a post- and proto-philosophical activity, in the wake of the critique of disciplinary philosophy's false self-sufficiency" (Osborne, "Problematizing" 20). It is questionable whether anything so vague as "false self-sufficiency" is easily separable from disciplinary practice which by definition insists on boundaries. Would it not be more reasonable to accept the said falsity as the very site of the production of anything like truth? For it is in inscribing boundaries that the Other is encountered, and sometimes even engaged. In sum, both Sandford's and Osborne's approaches conceptualize transdisciplinarity as philosophy's self-reflexivity, even while lifting it out of its disciplinary actuality, that is, necessary relations of urgency, performativity, and antagonism vis-à-vis its O/others, which are bound to culminate in *false* positions in one sense or another.[7]

By contrast, I argue, the Romantic notion of the fragment finds a suitable articulation in Freud's psychoanalysis precisely *qua* discipline, i.e., in the narrow sense that Sandford defines as not (yet) transdisciplinary, because the said discipline self-consciously and despite itself inhabited the frontier of science, thus manifesting the object in fragments, that is, fragmenting the language of inquiry, and consequently taking on anxiety as its operative affect.[8] The disciplinary praxis testifies to the inherently transdisciplinary logic of the discipline. Freud did not need to argue on behalf of transdisciplinarity because psychoanalysis was itself an epistemic form that perturbed, infected, and affected all discourses with a transdisciplinary drive. To borrow Lacan's words, "psychology, and with it all the human sciences, underwent a profound revamping of perspectives due to conceptions stemming from psychoanalysis (even if it was without their

[6] Elsewhere Pfau situates the Jena Romantic pursuit of literature in the context of Kant's positing of "the aesthetic form as an (ironic) expression of the unattainability of its underlying rational motive—namely, the aesthetic idea" (*Romantic Moods*, 45). My point is that transdisciplinarity as a "rational motive" is by definition unattainable because it is all the time working in the very un/making of a discipline.

[7] In other parts of the Project's dossier featured in *Radical Philosophy*, Antonia Birnbaum's discussion on Adorno's concept of the "essay form" and Boris Groys's on Kojève's scenario of post-historical wisdom demonstrate how transdisciplinary concepts are by definition materially oriented. Birnbaum pays close attention to the "object": "If there is thus for Adorno a method of the non-methodical constructed by form, them it is because the method never existed separately from the object" (16). Groys illuminates the ways in which apparently disparate material realities motivate one another: "For Kojève, the necessity of revolutionary violence follows from the ineffectiveness of persuasive speech" (32).

[8] Pfau defines romanticism's "figural mode" as "the prevailing 'mood' of anxiety [constituting] the ontological echo of man as a strictly *historical* phenomenon, a 'being-in-the-world' that knows of its utter lack of any transcendent point of reference or 'ground'" (*Romantic Moods*, 16-17). This seems a better point of entry into the epistemological connection between psychoanalysis and German Romanticism, as anxiety is an affect par excellence of the Other. On this last point, see Lacan's *Anxiety*.

consent or even their knowledge)" (Lacan, *Écrits* 177). This does not mean, however, that all valorizing discourses on transdisciplinarity are now redundant. For obviously something slipped from its concept-praxis to necessitate the current effort to revive it, while this very effort in its wrongheaded orientation doubly confirms the slippage. I have argued that the discursive excision of science is the primary reason for this redoubled betrayal. The theoretico-philosophical vision of transdisciplinarity *qua* aggregation of concepts abstracted out of disciplinary praxis-contingency is the latest and, in some sense, most worrisome development. The supplement of "trans-" must, and can only, be activated on the site of disciplinarity: perpetually parrying and confronting the extimate science, Freud's psychoanalysis demonstrates that the fragment was an in/transitive *work* whose culmination is always "*unworking* [*désoeuvrement*], never named and still less thought, that insinuates itself throughout the interstices of the romantic work" (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, *The Literary Absolute* 57).

Is Psychoanalysis Then Science?

Michael T. Michael's straightforwardly disciplinary approach defends the scientific validity of Freud's dream interpretation, though not to arrive at a definite verdict: "We must therefore settle for what we have, no definite outcome, but a realistic prospect of one. For though my investigation has no sure conclusion, it has a positive message. Freud's theory may be still unproven, but it is in much finer fettle than has been thought" (Michael 215). Incidentally, the contrast between Michael's modesty and Osborne's certitude noted in the foregoing discussion, presents an intriguing interdisciplinary infiltration between theoretical philosophy invested in productive obscurity and analytic philosophy's championing of logic and clarity. Indeed, recall Osborne's dismissal of analytic philosophy cited earlier, and consider also Sandford's characterization of the latter as a "traditional, hegemonic academic discipline, which continues to deny the legitimacy of 'continental' philosophy" and "[reject] both inter- and transdisciplinarity and feminist theory" (Sandford, "Contradiction" 173). Are we now seeking approval and acceptance as conditions and/or rewards of the (transdisciplinary) work of criticism? Are denial and rejection ultimately attributable to any single discipline? The foregoing discussion has provided one possible answer, which can be formulated as an applied syllogism. First, science is excluded from the humanistic concept of transdisciplinarity. Second, analytic philosophy's epistemological and methodological mainspring is a certain claim to scientificity. Finally, therefore, a transdisciplinary discourse self-consciously

cultivated within theoretical philosophy must insist on the latter's difference from analytic philosophy, expelling its extimacy *qua* O/other, making it into an external enemy of philosophy *tout court*. The contemporary theoretical humanities' self-reflection might start at a symptomatic interpretation of this "transdisciplinary" situation.

Neither does the modesty of Michael's argumentative procedure translate into a theoretically productive indeterminacy. Against the theoretico-philosophical conceptualization of transdisciplinarity arising from, and as, the exclusion of science, Michael's book would seem to propose an alternative approach, i.e., accounting for philosophy and science as mutually implicated and formative. This is not, however, its main interest. The hyphen in the book's subtitle—"philosophico-scientific"—presumes a unity constituting the internal logic of analytic philosophy, rather than aspiring to the traversal of the disciplinary distance or difference. Ready with the analytical logic of scientific precision and dispassionate objectivity, Michael sets out to adjudicate the long-running dispute over the scientific status of Freud's theory of dream interpretation: through a literal rather than interpretive reading of the text, a judicious review of contrarian philosophical arguments exemplified by Karl Popper and Adolf Grünbaum, and a proposal for the future of dream interpretation as a method. This last, clearly distinguished from psychoanalysis as the "theory of the mind"—the "speculative" component—and as such privileged for its epistemological and clinical validity, is ruled a "live scientific hypothesis" (Michael, 36; 60; 207). A fast partnership between clarity and modesty thus defines Michael's project:

> My aim is to evaluate Freud's theory on his own terms—as a theory that is plausible, scientific, and lasting . . . . It is not a polemical book. I have no axe to grind or vested interest to serve, no need to take sides. It is an attempt at an objective appraisal, an effort to engage sincerely with criticisms. Where Freud's theory is defensible, I will defend it; where it is not, I will assess the degree of damage rendered by the objection. (xv-xvi)

The most instructive lesson lies then in the ways in which the two contrary traditions of philosophical thought coincide in their errors: while the theoretico-philosophical humanities' aspiration to transdisciplinarity has reduced psychoanalysis to an immaterial conceptuality by purging science from its disciplinary reality *cum* ontological real, analytic philosophy's unabashedly disciplinary interests have completely overlooked the status of psychoanalysis *qua* symptom of science. Both traditions thus miss the genuine value of (trans)disciplinary psychoanalysis to the extent that both take as a premise the mutual exteriority of psychoanalysis and science.

Ironically, it is one of the most formidable detractors of psychoanaly-

sis who, in his very critique of it, throws light on its fundamental truth. As Michael confirms for us, Karl Popper's "demarcation criterion, the purported way of distinguishing science from non-science," was born of the "contrast that [Popper] saw between psychoanalysis and physics" (119-120). Of interest is precisely the urgency to demarcate science in the face of psychoanalysis. Does this not paradoxically illuminate their proximity, indeed an ambiguity of the most troubling sort that (dis)orders their relation? Popper argues that the fundamental failure of psychoanalysis in its claim to science is its "unfalsifiability": "its propositions are so designed as to be immune to contradictory evidence, because every imaginable state of affairs can somehow be reconciled with them" (qtd. in Robinson 199). Psychoanalysis is thus no more than a pseudoscience. In Popper's words, "Whether a man sacrificed his life to rescue a drowning child (a case of sublimation) or whether he murdered the child by drowning him (a case of repression) could not possibly be predicted or excluded by Freud's theory; *the theory was compatible with everything that could happen*." Notwithstanding Adolf Grünbaum's criticism of this hypothetical example as "grossly contrived," the crux of Popper's argument is well in line with Freud's theory (Robinson 200). Freud's concept of "overdetermination" captures precisely this complication, but not to warrant "infinite" interpretation as Sandford seems to suggest in the context of the dream *qua* fragment (Sandford, "The Dream" 25). It behooves us never to forget Freud's insistence on the necessarily correct interpretation. Recall, for instance, Freud's case of the Wolf Man. After humoring his "opponents" by testing in good faith their variously un-psychoanalytical interpretive schemes, Freud finally comes to the conclusion that he cannot but stand by the "primal scene" as the key component of the Wolf Man's case—a "construction" that nonetheless speaks the truth of reality better than any reality as consciously recalled (*Standard Edition* XVII: 102).

Most interestingly, Michael's exegesis of the demarcation criterion finally arrives at the conclusion that "strictly speaking, no theory is falsifiable" because falsifying observation statements cannot be "known to be true" (Michael 122). Furthermore,

> Popper knew this, but he nevertheless thought the ideal situation [where the statements can be known to be true] could be replicated by fiat. Scientists, he demanded, must make methodological decisions to accept the background and observation statements as true, even though they can never know that they are. Only if they do so will the logic of falsificationism apply. (122)

This is a thoughtful challenge to an important philosophico-scientific premise. Ultimately, however, Michael's critique ends at this level of logic, and no consideration follows as to what this oversight, condoned and perpetuated, might signify

for the larger discursive regime—i.e., discipline—which Popper represents and Michael writes within. Is not this authorial decision what constitutes the disciplinary praxis in question—the preservation of premise, method, and limits? Does it not disallow the self-reflexivity of the subject of knowledge vis-à-vis the operative mode of knowledge production, which would be precisely a sign of immanent transdisciplinarity?

Freud would have had plenty to offer in interpretation. For he asks, apropos of the "sceptical" jokes, which "[make] use of the uncertainty of one of our commonest concepts," namely "truth": "Is it the truth if we describe things as they are without troubling to consider how our hearer will understand what we say? Or is this only jesuitical truth, and does not genuine truth consist in taking the hearer into account and giving him a faithful picture of our own knowledge?" (*Standard Edition* VIII: 115). In a similar vein, Lacan comprehends psychoanalysis, religion, and science in the single relation of the subject to *objet a*, or object-cause of desire, the linked terms signifying the (obscurity of) cause that can never coincide with the object (available for the senses to consume or possess):

> [The] man of science could be approached . . . in the way in which, through a series of precautions, he protects himself from a number of questions concerning the very status of the science of which he is the servant. This is one of the most important problems from the social point of view—less important, however, than that of the status to be given to the corpus of acquired scientific knowledge. We will not appreciate the full implication of this corpus of science if we do not recognize that it is, in the subjective relation, the equivalent of what I have called here the *objet petit a*. (*Four Fundamental Concepts* 264-265)

There is a fissure inherent to science, and scientific knowledge can easily function as its false filler. At stake is then not simply Freud's psychoanalysis or Popper's philosophy of science, with their respective ideas aspiring to the status of truth. Our central concern should rather be the ways in which disparate systems of knowledge can and do (whether recognized or not) transpire *in antagonism*, which I have defined not as a relation between but rather as extimacy, i.e., the Other in the deepest interior, simultaneously ensnaring and generating the subject (of and as knowledge) in the psychical economy of desire and drive.

From Guattari back to Freud

As mentioned above, the Project finds an exemplary instance of transdisciplinarity in Félix Guattari's work, which Osborne describes as "[appearing] as the immanently philosophical dimension of a social critique of the Lacanian

psychoanalytical problematic" (Osborne, "Problematizing" 21). The affinity thus implicitly established between "immanently philosophical" and "social" seems meant to preserve a certain register of materiality, deterring philosophy's disciplinary tendency toward the "repetitive structure" of dialectics, for instance; while keeping transdisciplinary philosophy open to "nonphilosophical others" (Osborne, "Problematizing" 21).[9] We might observe that the "social"—either as the antagonistic field of relations or a perspective thereon—compensates for the absence of science in transdisciplinary philosophy. While both terms signal an immersive relation to objects of inquiry, however, they are certainly not mutually substitutable: one is a potential object of reflection for philosophy; and the other directly philosophy's own materiality inasmuch as it inscribes the latter's disciplinary status at its origin and border. Meanwhile, in arguing that "[transdisciplinarity] must become transversality between science, the socius, aesthetics and politics" in order to cope with contemporary problems, Guattari looks far beyond the social:

> There is no general pedagogy relative to the constitution of a living transdisciplinarity. It is a matter here of initiative, the taste for risk, for exiting pre-established schemas, the maturing of the personality . . . . Once again, much more will be gained in this register by referring to processes of aesthetic creation than to the standardized, planned, bureaucratized visions that reign too frequently in centres of scientific research, laboratories and universities. (Guattari 134-136)

Simultaneously evocative of German Romanticism and remote from the institutional framework of the Project, Guattari's concept of "transversality" is an "exploration of, experimentation with, an *unconscious* that has challenged the autonomy and sufficiency of any and every project" (Goffey 125; my emphasis). For Guattari, the social is not an ontologically privileged term but merely one among diverse referential and objectal points of access to the world inhabited, e.g., as "social fields"—hence his vision of transdisciplinarity as the need to "rethink human life in terms of a generalized ecology—environmental, social and mental—that [he] called ecosophy" (Guattari 132).

Theoretical or analytic, contemporary philosophy's engagement with psychoanalysis seems in large part constrained by an exclusive stance with regard to science. The increasingly dominant transdisciplinary inflections seem to aggravate rather than improve the situation. As we have seen, the theoretical humanities' version of transdisciplinarity operates in contradiction: it excludes

[9] Lisa Baraitser's article, "Temporal Drag: Transdisciplinarity and the 'Case' of Psychosocial Studies," published as part of the Project, presents a similar appeal to the "social" by way of "psychosocial studies," characterized there as a new transdisciplinary "field."

or corrects the disciplines that seem unresponsive to its call. Freud's starting point, by contrast, is the existential condition of psychoanalysis as a novel discipline, indeed an entirely new discourse of science. Freud's remarks to potential future members of the psychoanalytical profession are indicative, scaling from hysterical rejection to calculated maneuvering:

> If, however, there should actually turn out to be one of you who did not feel satisfied by a fleeting acquaintance with psycho-analysis but inclined to enter into a permanent relationship to it, I should not merely dissuade him from doing so but actively warn him against it. As things stand at present, such a choice of profession would ruin any chance he might have of success at a University, and, if he started in life as a practising physician, he would find himself in a society which did not understand his efforts, which regarded him with distrust and hostility, and unleashed upon him all the evil spirits lurking within it. (*Standard Edition* XV: 16)

To advance Freud's logic a little further, the (trans)discipline of psychoanalysis requires nothing less than an act of faith because any relationship to it is "permanent." For psychoanalysis, science is the cause of desire, its extimate kernel, and the pursuit of it a sure path to subjective destitution of the disciplinary practitioner as well as the discipline. Neither alienating nor idolizing science, all the while (un)working (at) its apparent closure, Freud demonstrates how the Other *can* be engaged precisely and indeed *only* where it lacks, that is, where the subject is constituted as lack.

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佛洛伊德介於兩個哲學或心理分析跨領域研究

摘要

本文評估某些理論人文研究跨領域的盛行，尤其專注於探討長期科學與人文，「歐陸」（理論）哲學及分析哲學的對立。藉由分析佛洛伊德夢的解析理論跨領域研究及對照夢解析的分析理論具科學性，我在本文闡明心理分析不同角度相對應的不同（跨）領域哲學方法論。本文結論爲跨領域的理論論述，包括心理分析應用，混淆了科學成爲生成他者，無法更進一步，即使批評分析哲學利用科學作爲實證性証明。兩者哲學思維皆無法說明科學作爲哲學以及心理分析的「外密性」（ex-timate)。此失敗將很難達到跨領域的眞正功用性，而佛洛伊德心理分析作爲學科企圖利用此「外密性」作爲其動力及實踐。

關鍵字：跨學科性、心理分析、外密性、科學與人文、歐陸哲學、分析哲學